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Australia's defense‑funded report hypes risks to subsea cables to 'serve military goals'_我的网站
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原标题：Pixel 7将用上自研Tensor G2处理器 谷歌真会玩：免费送薯片Pixel 7将用上自研Tensor G2处理器 谷歌真会玩：免费送薯片 全球的手机品牌越来越青睐自己研发处理器，谷歌也不例外，Pixel系列使用了自研的Tensor芯片，Pixel 7系列手机即将在10月份发布，为了给新机新处理器造势，谷歌营销部门玩出了一个新花样——送薯片。这里是借用了英文中chips的双关，它既可以是芯片，也可以是薯片，多年来用这个顽梗的不止谷歌一家，之前AMD及Intel也用薯片玩过营销，谷歌去年在Pixel 6上也有类似的活动。谷歌发起的这个活动名为Google Original Chips Campaign，在活动网上留言，谷歌会抽取2000个幸运儿，赠送4种原创薯片。这四种薯片的口味和包装也是非常独特的，外观设计上借鉴了谷歌Pixel 7系列的风格，包装颜色也是跟手机对应的，口味有奶油、烤洋葱、柠檬盐及黑胡椒味。 
Published by the National Security College at the Australian National University (ANU), the paper claimed recent damage to cables in the Baltic Sea and around China's Taiwan region suggests "state actors are now actively probing and testing cable infrastructure in peacetime as part of broader hybrid warfare strategies" to rapidly degrade connectivity at the outset of a conflict, The Australian reported.
The paper claimed 16 privately owned subsea cables that carry 99 percent of Australia's internet traffic are a "high priority target" for Australia's adversaries that could be severed in a conflict, threatening the nation's economy and social fabric, according to The Australian.
The report singled out China and Russia for blame, saying that there have been multiple apparent attacks on submarine cables in recent years in European waters as well as near China's Taiwan region, suspected to be linked to Russia and China, the Straits Times reported.
However, the report cites a 2025 voyage by Chinese research vessel Tan Suo Yi Hao along Australia's western and southern coastlines as evidence to back its claim that "potential adversaries are actively gathering information about Australia's cable infrastructure."
This report, relying on the routine scientific operations of a Chinese research vessel in 2025 to level allegations of offensive actions against China, and employing ambiguous terminology such as "suspected" and "potential," demonstrates Australia's evidentiary leap, Chen Hong, director of the Australian Studies Center of East China Normal University, told the Global Times on Monday.
This erroneous claim was refuted by the Chinese Foreign Ministry at the time. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said on March 31, 2025 that China carries out normal activities at sea in accordance with international law, including UNCLOS.
"We hope Australia will have a right understanding of this and stop the groundless suspicion and speculations," Guo added.
This is not the first time certain Australian politicians has leveled baseless accusations of China intending to sabotage its undersea cables. Back in May, Defense Minister Richard Marles claimed during the Shangri-La Dialogue that China ought to boost transparency around its maritime operations. He also asserted that a surge in damage to subsea cables had transformed the seabed into a "battlefield," per The Australian.
Chen said Australian side's scaremongering is tied to its predictive threat‑perception framework forged in recent years. This framework designates China and other countries as strategic competitors in advance, subsequently forces routine scientific activities into a confrontational framework, Chen said.
Apart from unfounded allegations against China, the paper claims Australia's defense military "must incorporate the defense of submarine cable infrastructure into its operational planning," according to The Australian.
It added the government should also consider up¬grading an auxiliary ship operated by the navy, ADV Guidance, to enable it to repair damaged cables.
The vast majority of submarine cable damages are caused by accidental factors such as fishing operations and vessel anchoring, rather than deliberate sabotage. For suspected cases of intentional damage, independent technical investigation bodies should be established, and the principle of "investigate first, characterize later" should be strictly applied, so as to prevent ordinary maritime accidents from escalating into diplomatic conflicts, Chen said.
The core problem of Australian side's submarine cable security lies entirely with itself. Instead of addressing its own infrastructure shortcomings and improving its domestic protection and maintenance systems, the Australian side has chosen to continually exaggerate external threats and stoke bloc confrontation, the expert added.
Chen said that by fabricating alleged Chinese threats, Australian side seeks to "rationalize" its military spending increases and underwater force expansion. The submarine digital infrastructure originally meant to serve global development has been labeled along us versus them lines, and this constitutes the biggest hidden danger, he added.
。谷歌Pixel 7系列手机将在10月6日发布， 这次仍然使用了自己定制的芯片Tensor G2，目前官方尚未公布这颗芯片的细节，传闻谷歌仍然会坚持“2+2+4”的方案，由三星代工。返回搜狐，查看更多责任编辑：
。Published by the National Security College at the Australian National University (ANU), the paper claimed recent damage to cables in the Baltic Sea and around China's Taiwan region suggests "state actors are now actively probing and testing cable infrastructure in peacetime as part of broader hybrid warfare strategies" to rapidly degrade connectivity at the outset of a conflict, The Australian reported.
The paper claimed 16 privately owned subsea cables that carry 99 percent of Australia's internet traffic are a "high priority target" for Australia's adversaries that could be severed in a conflict, threatening the nation's economy and social fabric, according to The Australian.
The report singled out China and Russia for blame, saying that there have been multiple apparent attacks on submarine cables in recent years in European waters as well as near China's Taiwan region, suspected to be linked to Russia and China, the Straits Times reported.
However, the report cites a 2025 voyage by Chinese research vessel Tan Suo Yi Hao along Australia's western and southern coastlines as evidence to back its claim that "potential adversaries are actively gathering information about Australia's cable infrastructure."
This report, relying on the routine scientific operations of a Chinese research vessel in 2025 to level allegations of offensive actions against China, and employing ambiguous terminology such as "suspected" and "potential," demonstrates Australia's evidentiary leap, Chen Hong, director of the Australian Studies Center of East China Normal University, told the Global Times on Monday.
This erroneous claim was refuted by the Chinese Foreign Ministry at the time. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said on March 31, 2025 that China carries out normal activities at sea in accordance with international law, including UNCLOS.
"We hope Australia will have a right understanding of this and stop the groundless suspicion and speculations," Guo added.
This is not the first time certain Australian politicians has leveled baseless accusations of China intending to sabotage its undersea cables. Back in May, Defense Minister Richard Marles claimed during the Shangri-La Dialogue that China ought to boost transparency around its maritime operations. He also asserted that a surge in damage to subsea cables had transformed the seabed into a "battlefield," per The Australian.
Chen said Australian side's scaremongering is tied to its predictive threat‑perception framework forged in recent years. This framework designates China and other countries as strategic competitors in advance, subsequently forces routine scientific activities into a confrontational framework, Chen said.
Apart from unfounded allegations against China, the paper claims Australia's defense military "must incorporate the defense of submarine cable infrastructure into its operational planning," according to The Australian.
It added the government should also consider up¬grading an auxiliary ship operated by the navy, ADV Guidance, to enable it to repair damaged cables.
The vast majority of submarine cable damages are caused by accidental factors such as fishing operations and vessel anchoring, rather than deliberate sabotage. For suspected cases of intentional damage, independent technical investigation bodies should be established, and the principle of "investigate first, characterize later" should be strictly applied, so as to prevent ordinary maritime accidents from escalating into diplomatic conflicts, Chen said.
The core problem of Australian side's submarine cable security lies entirely with itself. Instead of addressing its own infrastructure shortcomings and improving its domestic protection and maintenance systems, the Australian side has chosen to continually exaggerate external threats and stoke bloc confrontation, the expert added.
Chen said that by fabricating alleged Chinese threats, Australian side seeks to "rationalize" its military spending increases and underwater force expansion. The submarine digital infrastructure originally meant to serve global development has been labeled along us versus them lines, and this constitutes the biggest hidden danger, he added.
。谷歌Pixel 7系列手机将在10月6日发布， 这次仍然使用了自己定制的芯片Tensor G2，目前官方尚未公布这颗芯片的细节，传闻谷歌仍然会坚持“2+2+4”的方案，由三星代工。返回搜狐，查看更多责任编辑：
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Published on:18:54:12
